Dr. Jing Chen is a professor and William A. Black Chair of the Rowe School of Business at Dalhousie University. She received her Ph.D. from the Ivey Business School, the University of Western Ontario in 2008. Her research interests focus on the interface between operations management and marketing, revenue management, supply chain management, and game theory. She has published the articles in European Journal of Operational Research, Journal of Retailing, International Journal of Production Economics, Annals of Operations Research, Omega and other journals. She serves as an associate editor for International Transactions in Operational Research and International Journal of Inventory Research.
陈静博士是加拿大达尔豪斯大学罗威商学院William A. Black讲席教授。她在2008年获得加拿大西安大略大学毅伟商学院的博士学位。她的研究兴趣包括营销与运作管理交叉研究、收益管理、供应链管理和博弈论。她目前已在European Journal of Operational Research, Journal of Retailing, International Journal of Production Economics, Annals of Operations Research, Omega等期刊发表论文40余篇。她目前是International Transaction in Operational Research和 International Journal of Inventory Research的副主编。
We develop game-theoretic models to study the sourcing strategy of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the presence of a competing contract manufacturer (CCM). The OEM sells the product in a high-quality brand and has three strategy options: producing the product in house, or outsourcing production to either a CCM or a non-competing contract manufacturer (NCM). At the same time, the CCM provides its own product in a low-quality brand. We show that when the product qualities are exogenous, the OEM’s sourcing strategy decision depends on the OEM brand’s efficiency in producing and selling the product (the difference between quality and production cost), relative to that of the CCM brand. Interestingly, the OEM may prefer outsourcing to a CCM to soften price competition, even though this will mean a higher wholesale price; the CCM also prefers to produce for the OEM, even though its total demand may decrease. When the product qualities are endogenous, however, with quality competition, the OEM prefers either insourcing or outsourcing to an NCM, to increase quality differentiation, depending on its cost disadvantage in producing the high-quality product.
外包业务的飞速发展使得一些原来仅从事契约制造服务的非竞争性CM(Non-competing Contract Manufacturer，简称 NCM)具备能力生产和销售他们自己品牌的产品，从而演变成竞争性的CM(Competing Contract Manufacturer，简称 CCM)与 OEM 在下游的零售市场中展开直接竞争。另一方面，产品质量在外包实践中极为重要，OEM 和 CCM 企业通常提供不同质量的产品在市场中进行竞争以满足消费者偏好的异质性。本报告考虑一个销售高质量产品的OEM和一个销售低质量产品的CCM, 分别在产品质量外生和产品质量内生的情形下讨论OEM的外包策略决策：自制产品、外包生产给CCM、外包生产给NCM。