Tao Li is an associate professor with tenure at Santa Clara University. He joined the Operations Management & Information Systems department in the Leavey School of Business at Santa Clara University in Fall 2012.
Professor Li’s research interests include supply chain management with a special emphasis on sourcing strategy with unreliable suppliers, supply chain coordination, and the operations-marketing interface. His scholarship has appeared in leading academic journals such as Production and Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research. His scholarship has been supported by the Santa Clara University Research Grant, the Leavey Research Grant, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China. He is the recipient of the Leavey School of Business Extraordinary Research Award.
Professor Li serves as a Senior Editor and a member of Editorial Review Board for Production and Operations Management and the treasurer of the Chinese Scholars Association for Management Science and Engineering. He has been a regular reviewer for top journals including Management Science, Operations Research, and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management.
李涛副教授任职于圣塔克拉拉大学利维商学院信息系统与分析系，研究方向为运营管理、供应链管理。李涛副教授在顶级期刊（Production and Operations Management，European Journal of Operational Research， International Journal of Production Research等）发表十余篇论文，并获得多次优秀论文奖，拥有着丰富的科研经历和教学经验。
We study a problem of a retailer who orders from two competing strategic suppliers subject to independent or correlated disruptions and responds by setting the retail price upon delivery, which we call responsive-pricing. The suppliers compete by setting their wholesale prices. We model this problem as a Stackelberg-Nash game with the suppliers as the leaders and the retailer as the follower, and obtain its equilibrium explicitly. We perform sensitivity analyses with respect to suppliers' production costs, reliabilities, and their correlation. Surprisingly, we find that an increase in the reliability of a supplier may, counter to our intuition, hurt him due to responsive-pricing. Furthermore, in contrast to literature, we find that a high disruption correlation may benefit a supplier who has a cost advantage, because of responsive-pricing, and total order quantity may increase in that correlation due to intense suppliers competition.