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光华讲坛—A Responsive-Pricing Retailer Sourcing from Competing Suppliers Facing Disruptions

发布时间:2019-07-04

主讲人:美国圣塔克拉拉大学 李涛副教授

主持人:工商管理学院  甘湘华副教授

时间2019715日(星期一)13:00-14:00

地点:西南财经大学柳林校区通博楼A209会议室

主办单位:工商管理学院、科研处


主讲人简介:

Tao Li is an associate professor with tenure at Santa Clara University. He joined the Operations Management & Information Systems department in the Leavey School of Business at Santa Clara University in Fall 2012.

Professor Li’s research interests include supply chain management with a special emphasis on sourcing strategy with unreliable suppliers, supply chain coordination, and the operations-marketing interface. His scholarship has appeared in leading academic journals such as Production and Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research. His scholarship has been supported by the Santa Clara University Research Grant, the Leavey Research Grant, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China. He is the recipient of the Leavey School of Business Extraordinary Research Award.

Professor Li serves as a Senior Editor and a member of Editorial Review Board for Production and Operations Management and the treasurer of the Chinese Scholars Association for Management Science and Engineering. He has been a regular reviewer for top journals including Management Science, Operations Research, and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management.

李涛副教授任职于圣塔克拉拉大学利维商学院信息系统与分析系,研究方向为运营管理、供应链管理。李涛副教授在顶级期刊(Production and Operations Management,European Journal of Operational Research, International Journal of Production Research等)发表十余篇论文,并获得多次优秀论文奖,拥有着丰富的科研经历和教学经验。

主要内容:

We study a problem of a retailer who orders from two competing strategic suppliers subject to independent or correlated disruptions and responds by setting the retail price upon delivery, which we call responsive-pricing. The suppliers compete by setting their wholesale prices. We model this problem as a Stackelberg-Nash game with the suppliers as the leaders and the retailer as the follower, and obtain its equilibrium explicitly. We perform sensitivity analyses with respect to suppliers' production costs, reliabilities, and their correlation. Surprisingly, we find that an increase in the reliability of a supplier may, counter to our intuition, hurt him due to responsive-pricing. Furthermore, in contrast to literature, we find that a high disruption correlation may benefit a supplier who has a cost advantage, because of responsive-pricing, and total order quantity may increase in that correlation due to intense suppliers competition.

这篇文章研究一个可灵活定价的零销商从多个相关的不可靠供应商订货的博弈问题。供应商可以决定批发价。我们发现由于零销商可灵活定价的能力,高可靠性不一定对供应商有益。供应商之间的高相关性也可能对低成本的供应商有益。



主讲人 李涛 时间 2019年7月15日(星期一)13:00-14:00
地点 通博楼A209会议室